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Gary Shapiro 
World, Earth, Globe 
Geophilosophy in Hegel, Nietzsche, and Rosenzweig 
In an interview given a few weeks after the attacks of September 11, 
2001, Jacques Derrida interrogates the nature of what is popularly called 
globalization.1 He directs critical attention to the nai've assumption that rapid 
transportation, expanded commerce, and instantaneous communication are 
leading to a condition of homogenization and world community. Derrida 
rejects the end-of-history scenario advanced by writers such as Francis 
Fukuyama, in The End ofHistory and the Last Man, according to which liberal 
democracy and benevolent capitalism will establish a happy cosmopolitan 
world. He prefers to use the French term 111011dialisatio11 to preserve a sense 
of the human world, as opposed to the reductive scientistic notions of the 
planet or the cosmos. In doing so he retains some of the force of Husserl's 
Lebe11swelt or of Heidegger's concept of the world as the ineluctable horizon 
of human life. 
In his critique of current concepts of globalization, Derrida points out 
that the very processes of trade, communication, and transport are producing 
greater inequalities around the earth, and that these inequalities are ~pectacular, 
that is, that the very media essential to the process we call globalization 
make these inequalities vividly clear. The interview is a rich conspectus of 
the themes of Derrida's political thought, perhaps most penetrating in his 
thinking the concepts of the event, as that which arrives, and of futurity, 
the Zu-kzmft or l'ave11ir, that which is to come. I will not discuss this theme 
directly, but I hope readers will hear resonances of Derrida's questions 
in this exploration of three thinkers who embody distinct and competing 
approaches to understanding what it might be for the world, earth, or globe 
1 Jacques Derrida, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides," in Giovanni 
Borradori, ed., Philosophy in a Time of Terror (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003). 
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to move toward the condition of being a meaningful whole. I deliberately 
use three different terms here, both to respect the usage of the three thinkers 
I want to discuss - Hegel, Nietzsche, and Rosenzweig - and to maintain a 
certain contact with Derrida's insistence on the importance of the names 
and language that we use - or better, that uses us - as we try to make sense 
of things. One of the provocative suggestions in Derrida's "Autoimmunity" 
interview is that there is more than a punning connection between "territory" 
and "terror." In both French and English the etymological dictionaries note 
that territory may not derive from the Latin terra, as we could easily assume, 
but from terreur (cf. Oxford English Dictionary). That is, those who would 
make an illegitimate incursion into a tenitory, owned by another, ought to 
feel some terror. Derrida also suggested that territoriality loses much of its 
political force in the era of globalization or mondialisation, characterized as 
it is by mobility, flexibility, and transferability (with the important exception 
of strategic resources like oil, which provide continuing reasons for states 
and corporate powers to occupy or fight for territory). 
With Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy (in The Creation of the World), I think 
one of the crucial tasks in thinking about what we call globalization and the 
many concepts related to it is to understand the language, the discourse, in 
which we speak or might speak. I turn to three thinkers who have begun to 
develop such concepts. The most recent text that I will begin to explore, Franz 
Rosenzweig's essay, "Globus," was written about one hundred years ago. 
Yet it offers a philosophical account of boundaries and what Nietzsche called 
the direction of the earth. It has a special interest, I think, because it gives 
voice to a moment of indeterminacy, written as it was by a German soldier 
on the Balkan front in 1916 when the war's outcome was uncertain. Even the 
question of whether it should be called a world war was unanswerable. Such 
turning points in the history of the earth or world or globe can be instructive 
as we attempt to comprehend the crisis of the earth. 
What does it mean to live on the bounded, inscribed earth, an earth of 
borders and boundaries? Is the creation of boundaries the work of the artist 
or the devil - or both? I cite two texts that help to problematize this question. 
In his essay on "Walking" Henry David Thoreau fantasizes about "a people 
who would begin by burning the fences and let the forest stand!" And he 
goes on to recount a vision: "I saw the fences half consumed, their ends lost 
in the middle of the prairie, and some worldly miser with a surveyor looking 
after his bounds, while heaven had taken place around him, and he did not 
.;, 
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see the angels going to and fro, but was looking for an old post-hole in the 
middle of paradise. I looked again, and saw him in the middle of a boggy, 
stygian fen, surrounded by devils, and he had found his bounds without a 
doubt, three little stones, where a stake had been driven, and looking nearer, 
I saw that the Prince of Darkness was his surveyor."2 To this I will add two 
lapidary statements by Deleuze and Guattari: "Thinking takes place in the 
relationship of tenitmy and the earth"; "[the artist is] the first person to set 
out a boundary stone, or to make a mark."3 I should mention that Thoreau 
occasionally made his living as a land surveyor, so perhaps he qualifies as 
both devil and artist. 
I propose to consider three experiments in geophilosophy. I borrow this 
term from Deleuze and Guattari (DG), who thought of Nietzsche as its 
inventor. They distinguish it from three other approaches to philosophy. DG 
suggest that thought has largely been conceived either by its orientation to 
the object, the subject, or the other subject. If Plato and Aristotle embody a 
philosophy of the object, Descartes and Kant are philosophers of the subject, 
and Levinas and Habermas are philosophers of the other subject. Each 
of these pairs is famously different, but they coincide according to DG's 
surprisingly apt categories. Geophilosophy, then, would differ from these in 
that it conceives thinking as taking place in the relationship of territory and 
earth. 
Now we ask, what is the ground, which I have just tentatively called the 
earth, on which the devils or artists do their work? There is no simple answer 
to this question; here, as elsewhere, we need to recall Denida's injunction: we 
are always dealing with "more than one language." If Kant could constrnct 
a philosophical architecture, do we know what the ground was on which 
he claimed to build? Is histmy concerned with a world of hierarchically 
ordered nation-states that establish themselves on an otherwise contingent 
geographical basis, as Hegel has it? Should we rather be suspicious, as 
Nietzsche was, about whether "peoples and fatherlands" might be obstacles 
to the transformation of a humanity that would trnly become loyal to the 
earth? Or must we, with Rosenzweig, acknowledge that the finite globe itself 
2 Collected Essays and Poems (Library of America, 2001), 230. 
3 What is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 85; A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 316. 
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has from the beginning called for a teleological development, the reverse 
perhaps of Hegel's, in which the goal of history, with all its wars, is to become 
geo-graphia, the final and inclusive inscription of a common territory? 
For Hegel, geography is only the condition of history. It does not determine 
the story of freedom, but merely lays out the ground on which that st01y 
emerges. Mere ground is aujgehoben in the concrete universality realized 
in the development of states. World-hist01y is the highest development of 
objective spirit, a realm in which the state actualizes human freedom. The 
world, then, is something that emerges from human life on the earth; it 
presupposes a certain geography to which it is not reducible. Only with states 
is world-history possible and world-history is exclusively concerned with 
states. Hegel's restrictive conception of world-history has been obscured by 
many Anglophone commentators and translators; some of the latter blur the 
issues by translating Weltgeschichte as "universal history." But Hegel is clear: 
The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth. In this sense the state is the precise 
object of world-history in general. (/ 42) 
In world-history, however, we are concerned with "individuals" that are nations, with 
wholes that are states. (I 16) 
For Hegel the concepts "world" and "world-history" are highly singular, 
unifying, and exclusive. In his most systematic account of the place of world-
history in the Encyclopedia he describes the movement of spirit as realizing 
"the absolute final aim of the world" where spirit "becomes to the outward 
eye a universal spirit - a world-spirit" (E 549). World-history is the totality 
of states, and the succession of world-historical states is the home ground of 
Absolute Spirit - art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel famously compares 
the Oriental, Classical, and Germanic worlds in which one, some, or all are 
free - varying realizations of freedom all achieved through states. The life 
of states is contrasted with the existence of a "people" or "folk" (Volk), or, 
speaking more precisely, the state is the telos of a people, one sometimes 
achieved and sometimes not. For Hegel the mere Volk is not a subject of 
history: "A Volk with no state formation (a mere nation/Nation) has, strictly 
speaking, no history - like the Volker which existed before the rise of 
states and others which still exist as wild nations [als wilde Nationen]" 
(E 549; Hegel makes similar claims in the lectures, see I 16, 42, 50). 
A word concerning Hegel's reference to "mere nations" and "wild nations" 
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is in order. Nation is an adaptation of a Latin term, whose verbal root is 
11ascere, to give birth. Nations as such then are nothing but human beings 
of common ancestry, linked by natality, or genealogical affiliation. Hegel 
suggests that a nation may become a people, with some cultural coherence 
and shared values, and so enter a path of realizing and focusing itself as 
a state.4 
Why are migrations and wanderings specifically excluded from world-
history and why do migrants and wanderers tend to remain in the status of 
mere or wild nations? The root intuition seems to be that a world-historical 
people must stay in its place. The state must have sovereignty over a given 
te1Titory, which is the prerequisite for crystallizing the spiritual meaning of 
its people. Without the state there are simply wild nations living on the earth; 
there is as yet 110 world. Hegel could say of the "wild nations" what Heidegger, 
in The Fu11dame11tal Co11cepts of Metaphysics, said of animals, that they are 
weltarm, world-poor. When English translations render Weltgeschichte as 
"universal history," I assume that the aim, as in Carl Friedrich's introduction 
to Sibree's translation of the Philosophy of HisfOI)', is to downplay Hegel's 
political theology, his idea that "the state is God's march [Ga11g] through the 
world" (l 42). 
World-historical existence requires a state which is settled in a te1Titory. 
So it initially seems strange that Hegel emphasizes how the Germanic 
world, which enables the full flowering of Spirit and state, begins with 
barbarous, wandering, predatory peoples - Goths, Visigoths, and so on. Yet 
Hegel implies that these groups are no different than any others; no Volk 
enters history until engaged in the process of state formation. Hegel makes 
4 Nietzsche is well aware of the complex textual and linguistic history of Nation, 
Volk, and related terms. In Gay Science 146 he notes that "the names of Volker are 
usually terms of abuse," and goes on to remark: "The 'Germans': this originally 
meant 'heathen' [die Heiden]; that is what the Goths after their conversion named 
the great mass of their unbaptized kindred tribes [die grosse Masse ihrer 1111geta11.ften 
Sta111111verwandten], in accordance with their translation of the Septuagint in which 
the heathens were designated with a word that in Greek means 'the peoples' [Volker]; 
see Ulfilas." The original term in the Hebrew scriptures is gay, used often in the 
singular to refer to the Jewish nation or people [e.g., Genesis 12:2], but in the plural 
goyim referring to non-Jews or Gentiles. While the term has a neutral sense, in this 
context it has taken on a pejorative one in later usage, and Luther typically translates it 
as "heathens." The Latin Vulgate uses gens, the Septuagint ethnos. Revised versions 
of Luther's Bible generally substitute Nationen for Heiden. 
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German barbarism a virtue, claiming it was the Germans' strength to begin 
by absorbing and appropriating, unlike earlier historical peoples who begin 
with an internal development: 
The Greeks and Romans had reached maturity within, before they directed their 
energies outwards. The Germans, on the contrary, began with self-diffusion -
deluging the world, and overpowering in their course the inwardly rotten, hollow 
political fabrics of the civilized nations. Only then did their development begin, 
kindled by a foreign religion, polity, and legislation. (H 341) 
The very being of the German people is their transformation through 
encounters with the other, so they are uniquely suited to confirm Hegel's 
concept of the true identity as the identity of identity and non-identity. They 
seize Rome and appropriate Christianity almost thoughtlessly, but - such 
is the cunning of history - they are transformed in the end by what they 
have captured. They are predatory subjects who will be transformed by their 
object. On Hegel's account, this heritage allows the Germans, through the 
Reformation and the development of the modern state, to spiritualize the 
secular. Their wandering, migration, and nomadism become subordinated to 
the process of state formation in which religion is essential. 
Commenting on his contempora1y world of the 1820s, Hegel implies that 
the US is not a genuine state and has only a starkly contractarian and atomistic 
parody of a real constitution. It must be one of those republics destined for 
the dustbin of history. Hegel sought to explain how this simulacrum of a state 
exists, because he cannot consistently dismiss gross and obvious facts as 
mere appearances. He argues that the territorial expansion of the US serves 
as a safety valve through which the excesses of a state not grounded in a Volk, 
or given unity by monarchy and religion, nevertheless continues (I 89-90). 
Mobility and cultural indeterminacy, ordinarily enemies or predecessors of 
the Hegelian state, are here invoked to save the appearances, to explain a 
state which is not a true state. Forty years later, the Hegelian D. F. Strauss 
amplified this verdict, arguing that the US Civil War and its aftermath had 
demonstrated the ontological instability of the United States. With the US 
division into red (Republican) states and blue (Democratic) states, along 
with current and brewing conflicts over energy, water, immigration, and 
the fundamentalist social agenda, a Hegel of the new millennium would 
ask whether this experiment of a self-designing, federal constitutional 
republic without a religion could be expected to continue indefinitely. Hegel 
famously declared that America is the land of the future, while declining to 
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make specific projections of what that future would be. While he invoked 
Minerva's owl in claiming nothing more than retrospective knowledge, 
his remarks on the US show that he was not averse to excluding certain 
possibilities from the world's future. However, the persistence of a secular, 
multicultural republic, still not swept away by the movement of world-
history, should be an incentive to examining Nietzsche's interrogation of 
Hegel's intertwined conceptions of state and world. 
Questions about Hegel's statist geophilosophy intensify when we 
examine what he says about Islam in The Philosophy of World Histmy. Just 
as he thought the US could not continue indefinitely as a loosely federated, 
non-monarchical republic lacking an established religion, so he believed 
the days of Islam as a significant player on the stage of world history had 
ended hundreds of years earlier. I note that in both cases Hegel's evaluations 
of world historical viability are based largely on issues of space, territory, 
and mobility. With regard to Islam, he embeds such territorial questions 
in a logical strncture that purports to explain the emergence of the post-
classical European state. Hegel's Germanic world involves three moments 
- the elements (governing its early formation), the middle ages (in which 
feudalism eventually gives way to monarchy), and modern times (marked 
by Reformation, Enlightenment, French Revolution, and reconstitution of 
the post-revolutionary state). In this triadic strncture (perhaps followed more 
obsessively by his note-taking students and editors than by Hegel himself), 
Islam appears as a middle term in the first triad that analyzes the emergence of 
the medieval state in the form of Charlemagne's empire. The argument goes 
like this: The presupposition of the Christian Germanic world is the migration 
of barbarian tribes or groups. These Goths, Visigoths, Vandals and others are 
merely paiticular; they and their movement ai·e ai·bitrary from the standpoint 
of Geist, determined merely by geography, immediate opportunity, or the 
whim of warlords. As these nations begin to "take firm root" (in territories) 
they are still characterized by a "dull and narrow intelligence," which splits 
everything into "a multitude of chance contingencies ... a tangled web of 
convention" (H 355). The special virtue of the nomadic Germanic barbai·ians 
is their receptivity to the classical culture and especially the Christianity of 
the declining Roman world. 
Yet the Germanic appropriation is limited by its particularism, and so the 
European movement as a whole requires the shock of extreme universality 
that comes with the rise of Islam. As Hegel puts it, 
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[In this] political edifice of chance, entanglement, and particularity, the ve1y opposite 
direction necessarily made its appearance ... in the revolution of the east, which 
destroyed all particularity and dependence, and pe1fectly cleared up and purified the 
soul and disposition, making the abstract One the absolute object of attention and 
devotion, and to the same extent pure subjective consciousness. (H 356) 
This notion of the abstract One is a familiar topos in Hegel, associated 
typically with Judaism and Islam, and illustrated by the impossibility of 
describing or representing God; hence the iconoclastic refusal of visual 
images in religious art. In the expansion of Islam and its concept of the 
universal wmna, Hegel detects the vanishing of "all limits, all national and 
caste distinctions" (H 357). On his account, this universality is enabled by 
the identification of the Arabs and the deserts where "nothing can be brought 
into a firm and consistent shape" (H 357). Here Hegel sees nothing but an 
episodic succession of wars, caliphates, and kingdoms where "nothing firm 
abides" (H 358). The consequence is that the Islamic empire was easy prey 
for invading Seljuks and Mongols; that is, one mobile assemblage of people 
was necessarily at the mercy of other migratmy or nomadic groups. In the 
1820s Hegel can pronounce that 
At present, driven back into its Asiatic and African quarters, and tolerated only in 
one corner of Europe through the jealousy of the Christian powers, Islam has long 
vanished from the stage of history at large, and has retreated into Oriental ease and 
repose. (H 360) 
It is then not surprising that Francis Fukuyama, championing the Kojevian 
"end of history" reading in 1992, at the high point of US triumphalism, 
does not know how to integrate the Islamic countries of the world into his 
analysis. His metanarrative simply brackets the case of Islam, seeming to 
acknowledge that it exceeds his framework. 
It would be easy to ridicule Hegel's parallel dismissal of what he sees 
on the one hand as the disorganized multitude of the US, enabled only by 
the safety valve of westward expansion, and on the other, the impossible 
project of Islamic empire which is based on the amorphous desert with its 
wandering nomads. Yet perhaps a more critical understanding is possible; 
such an analysis would look more closely at Hegel's crncial but undeveloped 
concepts of geography, space, and territoriality. 
First, might Hegel be correct in attdbuting the persistence of the US 
in its republican, secular form to territorial expansion? Hegel wrote in the 
1820s before US conquests in wars with Mexico and Spain, the acquisition 
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of Hawaii, Alaska, and various outposts around the world. If the US is 
now recognized as an empire, by analysts on both right and left, is this not 
because it extends its military and economic territ01y to all continents? Why 
must empire be limited to geographically continuous areas? Perhaps in the 
immediate post-Napoleonic period in which Hegel lectured empires were 
indeed in decline, and he may have been misled by his teleological concept 
of hist01y to take this as an irreversible tendency. 
Second, might we consider a contemporary revision of Hegel's thesis 
that political Islam is doomed because of its affiliation with the amorphous, 
indeterminate, shifting sands that comprise the space of the desert? As 
many analysts suggest, the emergence of instantaneous communication 
networks and rapid air travel have produced a new virtual space in which 
we constantly discover fresh forms of mobility and power. Certainly there 
would be no "global war on terror" as George W. Bush called it, unless this 
space were actively in play. In 1950, reflecting on the course of World War 
II and the Cold War then taking shape, the German political theorist Carl 
Schmitt outlined what he saw as three major forms of political hegemony, 
international law, and warfare. In The Nomos of the Earth he schematized 
these as distinct forms of the nomos (fundamental law, but more primordially 
territorial division, establishment of boundaries). The nomos at first took 
the form of the division of land masses; after the impetus to navigation, 
trade, and colonization triggered by the European discove1y of the Americas, 
the more comprehensive focus was centered on the commerce and law 
of the sea; the twentieth century saw the rise of air power; even in 1950 
Schmitt saw that this could be expanded to extra-planetary space. Might 
the virtual and ubiquitous network of communication, finance, organization, 
and strategy - made possible like earlier metamorphoses of the nomos by 
technological innovations - be a fourth way of stmcturing and deconstructing 
the boundaries of the earth? 
If Hegel's geophilosophy is necessarily retrospective, Nietzsche's is a 
"philosophy of the future" (Zu-kunft or advent), a thought of the direction of 
the earth (Sinn der Erde) tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Nietzsche 
calls on his readers to attend to the direction of the earth, the earth understood 
as the inevitably plural site of mobile human habitation, the earth of nomads 
as well as states. While most readers have seen this as simply a call to 
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honor the this-worldly body and its passions, for Nietzsche earth must be 
understood also in a fully geopolitical and geophilosophical sense. If the 
great events that punctuated world-history according to Hegel are only 
stages of the development of the state in Chlistian Europe, and its partial 
anticipation in Asia, Greece, and Rome, could there be an event of the earth? 
How might we be vigilant in awaiting and seizing the moment or kairos of 
that event? 
Nietzsche challenges Hegel's notion that peoples are now in their proper 
places, organized by state and religion, and exhibiting a hierarchical order 
in their realization of the freedom that is the purpose of world-history. For 
him, the sense of history does not move from east to west while the peoples 
remain stationary: the peoples move in all directions, both ways between 
north and south, and exhibit internal movements, intermingling, mixing, 
and sometimes homogenizing, producing what we have recently been wont 
to call multiculturalism, hybridity, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanism. 
Nietzsche observes the rise of nationalism and its appeal to myths and 
ideologies of fatherland; he also notes the scare tactics used to justify war and 
states of exception. Yet he witnesses as well the emergence of transnational 
"good Europeans" and discerns on the horizon the gradual collapse of the 
nation-state and the rise of a humanity capable of raising the question of the 
direction of the earth. 
Nietzsche deliberately speaks of the earth rather than the world. He was 
exasperated by the Hegelians when they invoked the concept of "world," 
"world-history," or "world-process" (this last term was used by an early target, 
Eduard von Haiimann). Nietzsche's ctitique is ultimately anti-theological. 
Among his famous quips is "I am afraid we have not gotten rid of God 
yet, because we still believe in grammar" (TI "Reason" 5). Let us read this 
alongside another aphorism that stresses the relation between God and world: 
Around a hero everything becomes a tragedy, around a demi-god everything becomes 
a satyr play; and around God everything becomes - what do you think? perhaps the 
"world"? (BGE 150) 
So world is a theological concept, as is Hegel's state, both being among 
those shadows of God that we have yet to dispel (GS 108). If for Hegel 
"the state is the march [Gang] of God through the world," for Nietzsche the 
earth is a human-eaith of mobile multitudes that can prepare a way for the 
post-human. Nietzsche's "great politics" of the eai·th constitutes a response 
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to Hegel's theologico-political treatise Philosophy of World Hist01y and its 
later adaptations. 
Nietzsche turned away from the Hegelian concept of world, entangled 
as it is with that of the state, and toward a notion of the earth as the most 
general site of human life. Earth, then, is a political concept for Nietzsche. 
For a politics of the earth, the state is not an ultimate goal, but one among 
a number of social and political fmms whose genealogy we can trace and 
whose dissolution we can envision. Despite the fervent, noisy nationalism 
of the early Bismarck era, he argues that there is a real counter-movement to 
statism, as Europeans become increasingly mobile or "nomadic," loosening 
traditional ties and identities. Nietzsche repudiates Hegel's "so-called world-
history," which excludes wanderings and migrations; he takes nomadism to 
be an indisputable facet of European modernity: 
Trade and industry, the post and the book-trade, the possession in common of all 
higher culture, rapid changing of home and scene, the nomadic life now lived by all 
who do not own land - these circumstances are bringing with them a weakening and 
finally an abolition of nations. (HH 475) 
Since the nation state conceives itself as a population of common ethnic origins 
and culture, it finds itself in an intrinsically unstable position, as mobility 
and mingling conttibute to forming a "mixed race" (Mischrasse). There is 
no point in resisting the inevitable. In his vocabulary the nomadic generally 
designates a collective rather than an individual mode of tenitorialization. 
Nietzsche notes that the main factor retarding the withering away of the 
national state is fear: its exaggeration or fabrication of external or internal 
threats to the population's security. These furnish excuses to declare a state of 
exception, in which constitutional or traditional liberties are ovenidden and 
the sovereign unity of the state affirmed - as in the Bush regime after 9/11. 
Hegelian monarchy, with its theological affiliation, is being replaced by the 
national security state. Nietzsche speaks of a "Not- und Belagerungszustand" 
(HH 475), the equivalent of Carl Schmitt's Ausnahmezustand. Fifty years 
later Schmitt was to define sovereignty in these terms: the sovereign is the 
one who declares the exception. Schmitt offered this definition in his book 
Political Theology, which argues for a parallel between the sovereignty of 
God and the state.5 Nietzsche could have taken the equation differently: just 
5 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005). 
324 Gmy Shapiro 
as the madman who announces the death of God tells us that this scarcely 
comprehended news is still on the way, so the state is in a long-term process 
of dissolution, one of God's lingering shadows. 
Nietzsche foresees a long period of "transitional struggles," during which 
"the attitude of veneration and piety" toward the state will be undermined, as 
it comes to be seen in an increasingly pragmatic and utilitarian perspective 
(HH 472). Much government work will be reassigned to "private contractors" 
- that's "outsourcing"- another sign of the gradual "decline and death of the 
state." On the post-state and post-Hegelian earth "a new page will be turned 
in the storybook of humanity in which there will be many strange tales to 
read and perhaps some of them good ones." Just as the domination of the 
organizing principle of the racial clan gave way to the family and then to the 
state, so humanity will eventually hit upon "an invention more suited to their 
purpose than the state." 
Nietzsche's Europe is in crisis as it struggles with the collapse of 
Christianity, the emergence of democratic attitudes and practices, the threat 
of nihilism, and the possible rule of the herd and the last man. In Beyond 
Good and Evil Nietzsche sees the emergence in Europe of "an essentially 
supra-national and nomadic type of person who, physiologically speaking, 
is typified by a maximal degree of the art and force of adaptation" (BGE 
242).6 While this tendency may lead to homogeneity and the production of 
a type prepared for "slave!)' in the most subtle sense," other aspects of the 
development point in different directions. Mixing, wandering, and migration 
also produce a variety of singular hybrids, higher humans like Napoleon, 
Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heine, Schopenhauer, and Wagner (BGE 256). 
These experimental anticipations of the European Zu-kunft embody diverse 
mixtures of traditions and lineages. Although Europe "wants to become one," 
the "truth" of this desire is, at least for now, the proliferation of singularities. 
Accordingly, in the concluding aphorism of "Peoples and Fatherlands," 
Nietzsche emphatically declares that "this is the centwy of the multitude 
[Menge]!" This multitude is not, as some translators have it, identical with 
the masses.7 The multitude is diverse, masses are relatively uniform. The 
6 For a fuller discussion see G. Shapiro, "Beyond Peoples and Fatherlands," Journal 
of Nietzsche Studies 35136 (2008): 9-27. 
7 For example, both the first and most recent translations of BGE, by Helen Zimmern 
and Judith Norman (Cambridge), translate Menge in BGE 256 (and occasionally 
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multitude is formed by a mixing of races, cultures, ethnicities, and the like. 
This might result eventually in the formation of herds and masses, but more 
complexity is possible. Exemplary here is Nietzsche's discussion of the 
emergence of the Greeks from a mixing of Mongols, Semites, and others.8 
The chapter on "Peoples and Fatherlands" should be read as a thorough 
critique of Hegel's Weltgeschichte in which Nietzsche challenges Hegel on 
the state, human mobility, the persistence of national types, and the supposed 
east to west movement of the Weltgeist, that ghost or phantom, which is 
dispersed by the rise of a multitude who will not stay put to observe its passage. 
We need look no further than the US-Mexican border to see the pertinence 
of this reconfiguration of the Hegelian story in terms of a north/south axis 
which does not coincide with the rise of states. Among many testimonies 
I cite Gloria Anzaldua's book, Borderla11ds!La Frontera, exploring the 
complexity of that borderland, not merely a scar but an open, hemorrhaging 
wound left by the Mexican-American war, in which both the duality and 
the hybridization of US and Mexican peoples is further complicated by the 
tensions and mixings of Native American, Chicano, and mestiza strains, 
and inflected personally by the author's lesbian identification. Anzaldua 
elsewhere) as "masses." Other problematic English translations of Menge abound, 
e.g., Hollingdale's version of HH 472. See Menge in Grimm's Worterbuch: http:// 
germazope.uni-trier.de/Projects/WBB/woerterbuecher/dwb/wbgui 
See another crucial passage employing the distinction: "Statistics prove that there 
are laws in history. Indeed, it proves how common and disgustingly uniform the 
mass [Masse] is. You should have tried statistical analysis in Athens for once! The 
lower and more non-individual the mass [Masse] is, the statistical laws are that much 
stronger. If the multitude [Menge] is finer and nobler, the law goes to the devil" (KSA 
7 .642; cf. KSA 4.18, 7.119, 9.462, 12.96). 
8 KSA 8.96. Yirmiyahu Yovel says that "there is a marked lacuna in [Nietzsche's] 
thinking - the lack of a positive philosophy of the 'multitude'. Politics is not about 
the happy few, but about those ordinary people, the modern mass or 'herd' which 
Nietzsche did not care about and did not make the topic of any positive philosophical 
reflection." Yovel goes on to say that this political lacuna left (and still leaves) 
Nietzsche open to abuse by fascists, Nazis, and the like. Yovel conflates multitude, 
herd, and mass in "Nietzsche and the Jews: The Structure of an Ambivalence," in 
Nietzsche and Jewish Culture, ed. Jacob Golomb (New York: Routledge, 1997), 132. 
On what could be called Nietzsche's affirmative concept of the multitude or Menge, 
see Hubert Cancik, "'Mongols, Semites, and the Pure-bred Greeks': Nietzsche's 
Handling of the Racial Doctrines of his Time," in Nietzsche and Jewish Culture, 
55-75, and Shapiro, "Beyond Peoples and Fatherlands" (note 6 above). 
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transvalues the borderlands, finding vibrant multiplicity in a territory 
marginalized by the devilish surveyors of Thoreau's vision. 
Nietzsche emerges as a theorist of nomadism, migration, immigration, 
diaspora, cosmopolitanism, and hybridity. He is better equipped than 
Hegel to understand the demise or evisceration of the monarchical state 
with established (Christian) religion. Nietzsche could see a self-described 
hybrid (or "mutt") like Barack Obama as a paradigmatic voice of and for the 
multitude. We should also note that the Menge is not a universal class, but 
is conceived as an audience, which is not coextensive with the population 
at large (BCE 263, 269). In BCE 256, which announces the century of the 
multitude, it is introduced as the audience of the higher humans (Napoleon to 
Wagner) listed there. Goethe constructs a dialogue about such a multitude in 
Faust's "Prelude in the Theater," where the Menge is described as relatively 
educated, widely read, yet mixed in mood and background.9 The century of 
the nomadic multitude, then, as it frees itself from peoples, fatherlands, and 
states, is not so far from the society of the spectacle, making allowances for 
technological innovations in its promulgation and marketing. The bad news 
is that the multitude can be an audience for "tyrants of all sorts, including 
the most spiritual" (BCE 242), and the good news may be that at present 
they are still sufficiently diverse to resist a powe1ful religious reformation 
like the German one that brought Europe the disaster of religious war and 
the equally disastrous (in Nietzsche's eyes) modern state system (AOM 
226). However shifting and unstable the earth's multitude may be, its very 
diversity may be sufficient - if we are lucky - to resist the more monolithic 
forces of contemporary assassins and crusaders with their unitary visions of 
the world. 10 
Yet what does it mean to be loyal to the earth, to pledge one's troth (Treue), 
and become the earth's disciple (Jiinger), as Nietzsche's Zarathustra urges? 
Perhaps it begins with thinking the earth fully in its finitude, an event of 
9 Goethe, Faust, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Anchor, 1962), 68-81 (lines 33-
242); see also Faust's speech in the Easter scene 180-182 (lines 903-940), which 
emphasizes the variety and energy of the Menge. 
JO Cf. Gmy Shapiro, "Assassins and Crusaders: Nietzsche After 9/11," in Reading 
Nietzsche at the Margins, ed. S. V. Hicks and A. Rosenberg (West Lafayette: Purdue 
University Press, 2008), 186-204. 
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thought that becomes both possible and imperative in the age of new wars 
Nietzsche saw on the horizon. So I turn to a compelling but incomplete text 
composed in 1916 during the "Great War," which was to be recognized 
as the first of the world wars. This is Franz Rosenzweig's essay "Globus: 
Studies Toward a World-Historical Theory of Space," which was published 
many years after his death. 11 Rosenzweig is not generally recognized as a 
geophilosophical thinker. He is known mainly for his religious philosophy, as 
developed in his maste1ful and enigmatic work, The Star of Redemption, the 
frnit of his immersion in Geiman idealism, theology, and a personal strnggle 
that led to a renewed commitment to Judaism. As a volunteer in the German 
army, serving on the Balkan front, Rosenzweig wrote a series of meditations 
on the meaning of the war, the most important of which is "Globus." 
Rosenzweig's geophilosophy extends his concern with the question 
of orientation, a theme articulated in German Idealism. To answer Kant's 
question "What is Orientation in Thinking?" Rosenzweig turns to theology. 
To put the point quickly and schematically for now, he worries that prevailing 
forms of philosophy do not offer absolute orientation, but only relative forms. 
In October 1916 (while composing "Globus") Rosenzweig was engaged 
in a philosophical correspondence with Eugen Rosenstock; the exchange 
is recognized now as a decisive turning point in his thought. Rosenzweig 
asked Rosenstock how he conceived the relation between nature and 
revelation, and Rosenstock replied by turning the question to the subject of 
orientation: 
Natural understanding, then, knows front and back, left and right, and helps itself in 
this enclosure with a net of analogies. It makes comparisons and thus limps from one 
place to the next in this vast space .... The resolution not to take one's own position 
in this quarter of space as the center of knowledge, but as conditioned from above -
this renunciation of being omphalos kos111011 [the navel of the cosmos] is no longer 
a matter of the natural human understanding but is the means within us that makes 
revelation to, in, and for us possible.12 
11 Page numbers that follow refer to this text (Gin abbreviations). 
12 Eugen Rosenstock, letter of October 28-30, 1916; cited in Judaism Despite 
Christianity: The Letters 011 Christianity and Judaism between Eugen Rose11stock-
H11essy and Franz Rosenzweig (Schocken, 1971), 119-120. On the question of 
orientation I have found the following collection of Rosenzweig's essays with 
editorial comments very helpful: Franz Rosenzweig, Philosophical a11d Theological 
'vVriti11gs, ed. Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000). 
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Inspired by this answer, Rosenzweig sees the significance of revelation in a 
new way, drawing additional resources from Schelling's critique of Hegel's 
philosophy. During the war years 1916-17 he pursues two parallel paths, 
one philosophical-theological, the other geophilosophical-geopolitical, each 
of which insists on the importance of absolute orientation, and the historical-
dialectical path to achieving such orientation - yet on neither of these tracks 
makes explicit reference to the other. These are two great moments or zones 
of indeterminacy; "Globus" arises from an intense time of possibility, when 
the event of the war was defining itself and opening a future. 
On the smface, the war was generated by European states protecting 
their boundaries and privileges; it led to redrawing the map of Europe and 
lands beyond, new boundaries, and eventually a greater war. As the term 
"world-historical" in the subtitle of "Globus" signals, Rosenzweig was 
soaked in Hegel's philosophy of history and the state. Before the war he 
had substantially completed a pathbreaking study of Hegel's theory of the 
state. He saw the Reich proclaimed by Bismarck at Versailles in 1871 as 
consistent with Hegel's conception of reason realizing itself in history, while 
acknowledging an ambivalence concerning its ability to fully achieve that 
realization. When he published Hegel and the State after the war, he added 
a foreword and a concluding remark noting that the study no longer had its 
anticipated relevance to political and historical actuality. "A field of rnins 
marks the spot where the empire previously stood," he confesses in the 
foreword. In the concluding remark he continues to speak in the language 
of ruin, observing that "We feel the extent to which we are at the end today, 
when the century of Bismarck, at whose gate the Hegelian life stands like 
the thought before the deed, has collapsed."13 In the interval between writing 
the body of the book, which sought to reclaim the spirit of Hegel (the spirit 
of Hegel's spirit, we might say), came the war and "Globus." 
In "Globus" Rosenzweig begins by asking whether the conflict is a world 
war, as some say. He raises this question in 1916, before the US's entrance 
into the conflict, and while its outcome is still in doubt. It cannot be so called 
if one judges on the basis of the powers involved, for then neither the US nor 
East-Asian nations were belligerents or battlegrounds. Yet "if this name for 
the current war cannot be justified on account of the powers involved, it can 
be on account of its goals" (G 314). These goals, as he understands them, go 
13 Franz Rosenzweig, Philosophical and Theological Writings, 74-75. 
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far beyond any explicit aims of the contending parties. While Rosenzweig 
gives a detailed account of colonial rivalries and competition for spheres 
of influence that were more or less public and understood motives for the 
warring nations, what he takes to be the ultimate goal can be nothing less 
than the aim of "world-history," namely, the explicit unification of the earth, 
or to be more precise, the finite globe. "What we call world-history is nothing 
other than the earth's becoming [Werden] an enclosed historical space, a 
'world'" (G 314). If this "world" is conceived in Hegelian terms, then it must 
be a state, a single state. Is this what Rosenzweig sees on the horizon? One 
of the two named divisions of the "Globus" essay is "Okumene: Weltstaat 
und Staatemvelt" or "The Ecumenical: World-state and the World of States." 
While the essay proceeds without explicitly naming Hegel, it is a radical 
critique of the very idea of Hegel's narrative of world-history. Rosenzweig's 
"world-historical theory of space" is a counterpart to Hegel's world-historical 
theory of time and the state. What he shares with Hegel is an approach to 
the meaning of human history that stresses the importance of "great events," 
major turning points, the result of unanticipated consequences of actions 
undertaken for reasons seemingly unconnected or at odds with their results -
what Hegel called "the cunning of history." 
Hegel saw world-histmy as the production of a hierarchical order of states, 
each securely resting in its own territmy; he was forced into extraordinary 
maneuvers to explain and contain facts of nomadism, migration, and 
diaspora that threatened to dismpt his stmy. Rosenzweig begins by taking the 
existence of boundaries and borders, the basic constituents of sovereignty, 
as necessary starting points that become transitional phases within a larger 
development in which they are destined to disappear. World-histmy began, 
he claims in the first sentence of the essay, when someone claimed a part of 
the earth as his own, thus establishing Grenzen (borders), and the distinction 
between "mine" and "yours" (G 313). But this is only the beginning: 
The earth is thus determined, from creation on, to be covered [inscribed, iiberzagen] 
with borders. Being bounded [Begrenzbarkeit] is its nature, boundlessness only its 
1, final goal, but as the final goals of history always have a firm and visible substructure 
in natural things, so it is here. The boundlessness which remains the final goal of the 
earth is the sea's own from the very beginning. (G 313) 
Although no names are mentioned, we could say that Rosenzweig is playing 
Schelling against Hegel, a move well developed in his philosophical theology. 
Despite their common post-Kantian origins, Schelling came to see Hegel's as 
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a "negative" philosophy, one that constrncted a complex set of concepts and 
categories oblivious to the necessarily dark, unthought Abgnmd out of which 
all bounded things like concepts and categories emerge. In "Globus" the earth 
itself (Rosenzweig also terms it the Erdbal[) is such an Abgrund, a sheer 
given, unknown in its depths, a surd that requires a "positive" philosophy, 
involving an "absolute" or "radical empiricism" (to invoke both Schelling 
and William James). The earth resists full articulation, but we can situate its 
relation to the realm of the bounded. The sea plays this role of the unbounded 
in relation to the land as divided among states; the whole earth itself is the 
Abgnmd vis-a-vis the state-defined world of Hegel's world-history. 
Rosenzweig finds himself (knowingly or not) with a geophilosophical 
position that parallels Nietzsche's critique of Hegelianism. The earth 
becomes world, and the aim of world is to become earth again, but in a way 
that involves an awareness of its specific, finite, and surd character. Globus, 
then, can be defined as the earth comprehended and unified in its finitude. 
So Rosenzweig is still a Hegelian of sorts, because he sees the destiny of 
Globus in a higher form of reflection and consciousness. His narrative is 
marked by stages of increasing consciousness of the growing unity of the 
earth. These realizations are embodied in the equivalent of Hegel's world-
histmical figures, indeed they often are the same figures, but they are so 
for different reasons. So Alexander is important not simply for overcoming 
the limited form of the Greek polis and establishing the idea of a universal 
empire (Hegel), or for fusing the cultures of east and west (Nietzsche), but 
most significantly for seeking to go beyond the bounds of the Medite1rnnean 
world to what the ancients thought of as the Ocean surrounding the land 
at its outermost perimeter. Caesar, on this analysis, had a similar vision 
that coincided roughly with the Christian production of the concept of 
the oikomene, the common world (Rosenzweig notes that beginning with 
Augustus, Caesar's successors failed to understand, let alone pursue, this 
project). Whereas for Hegel, such men are world-histotical figures because 
of their contribution to new forms of the state (in which they destroy and 
supersede self-contradictory regimes, notably republics and democracies), 
for Rosenzweig it is their geographical vision, adumbrating a unified globus, 
which allows us to mark the epochs of world-history. 
Recount the full, intricate story Rosenzweig tells is not possible here. It 
involves the play of universality and particularity in medieval church-state 
relations, the early modern balance of power among European sovereignties, 
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the emergence of modern European nation-states, the so-called discove1y 
of America, colonial and imperial expansion, incorporation of the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans into the world sphere, the rise of the United States, and 
the conflict of the British Empire with Germany and Austria-Hungary that 
precipitated the Great War in which he served and wrote. Suffice it to say 
that read alongside (or better against) Hegel's world-history, this nairntive 
is not centered on freedom (as Hegel understands it) but on events mai·king 
transformations in the comprehension and hegemony over the earth as a 
whole. To cite his comprehensive statement of principle: "In both land and 
sea, therefore, the unity of the earth is the driving force of historical process 
[Geschehens]" (G 314). 
History is a matter of dialectical inversions and transformations, as with 
Hegel. For example, in the age of mercantile nationalism and initial colonial 
expansion, states strangely identify their inner identities with what is most 
external, their competitive standing in relation to other states: "With this 
[mercantile] concept of power, which finds its boundaries neither within 
itself nor in an idea of the world [Weltgedanken], but only in the power of 
the other, or the neighbor, the inner productive source of external power, the 
most external aspect of the inner life of the state, steps into the foreground: 
the economy [Wirtschaft]" (G 325). 
What then is the nature of the unity that the globe approaches? In 
the concluding sections of "Globus" Rosenzweig makes sweeping yet 
penetrating suggestions that bring together the oldest ideas of the earth 
with his contemporary situation in the midst of the war, which he now 
acknowledges as a world war. He distinguishes two archaic conceptions of 
the earth, Homeric and Biblical. In Homeric cartography, the MeditelTanean 
sea is bounded and surrounded by a circumference of land, as known to 
the Greeks and their successors. Beyond that surround of land lies Ocean, 
thought generally and indefinitely as the final limit of the earth. In the 
Biblical map, which Rosenzweig finds in the prophets and ancient kingdoms 
of the near east, the earth is a vast land mass with uncertain outer bounds, 
containing within it various bodies of water. While later Greek thinkers 
speculated intelligently that the earth was round, this received no experiential 
confirmation until the voyages of Columbus and other eai'ly navigators. 
Given the hundreds of thousands of years of human history, it is only very 
recently that we have been set the task of coming to terms with the finite 
sphericity of the En/ball. 
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The work required by this task has largely been accomplished by sea. That 
is, humans ventured into what was seen as the unbounded in order to seize 
territories, extending old boundaries or creating new ones. This brings the sea 
itself within bounds, hence the concern in the modern era with the law and 
freedom of the sea. This takes us from the problem of piracy, important for the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the conflict of British and German 
fleets in the twentieth, as Germany seeks to limit the power of the British 
Empire while establishing a parallel dominion of its own. It was German 
submarine attacks on US vessels, which were disregarding an embargo on 
Britain and her allies, that officially led to US entrance into the war (shortly 
after Rosenzweig broke off the essay) and to Woodrow Wilson's effectively 
declaiing it a world war (US historians tend to downplay the fact that the US 
respected the British "no shipping" zone which was enforced by mines rather 
than submmines). "Globus" makes no predictions about whether the US and 
Japan (two significant sea powers then still neutral) would enter the conflict. 
But Rosenzweig does offer an explanation of their neutrality up to that point. 
It confirms his conception of the ultimate meaning of the war and the spatial 
world-histmy of which it is a pait, namely, to fully realize the unity of the 
earth - that is, roughly what we call globalization. At the same time it mm·ks 
and defines the kairos, the event-al turning point of the war. 
Rosenzweig's analysis hinges on two claims which at first sound 
eccentric: (1) the war is essentially about Africa, and (2) the fortunes of 
Britain and her allies depend on enforcing a misreading of the nature of the 
globe. These claims are more plausible and more philosophical than they 
initially appear. A US reader may be surprised to hem· that the war was about 
Africa, given the iconic images of European trench wa1fare that dominate its 
representations.But in large part the conflict had to do with whether Germany 
could establish its own colonial empire and restrain Britain's quest for global 
hegemony. Ge1many had launched a number of colonial ventures in East 
and West Africa, joining rather late in the European stampede to occupy 
and exploit "the dark continent," a phrase that acquires a philosophical 
sense in Rosenzweig's analysis (see his discussion of the Berlin Congress 
of 1883). From a geopolitical standpoint he m·gues that having a foothold 
in the Cape (South Africa) was an essential component of Britain's empire, 
because of its crucial position on the circuit of Canada, Britain, India, and 
Australia. The Boers had achieved independence in a struggle with Biitain 
a few years earlier, aided by the neighboring German colony; yet during the 
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Great War, after fierce internal stmggle, they sided with Britain. As the "dark 
continent," Africa could also be understood in Schelling's sense as being an 
exemplary Abgnmd, the unknown, unmapped aspect of things. To say that 
the war is about Africa is to say that it is about who will be "lords of the 
earth" (Nietzsche's phrase) and that it involves coming to terms with what 
the unified globus will be. 
Rosenzweig's second thesis is that Britain has strengthened its position 
by publicizing a distorted cartography, one that obscures the globe itself. 
From a strategic point of view, he argues, one of Britain's principal aims 
must be to keep the US and Japan neutral or possibly gain the US as an 
active ally. It does this by persuading these two powers, whom he regards 
as natural enemies facing each other across the Pacific, to see the war as an 
internal European affair. If the US and Japan were to understand that global 
hegemony is at stake, beyond the European theater, they might engage in the 
conflict in unpredictable ways, endangering British plans. The Pacific Ocean 
was relatively underdeveloped as a scene - Rosenzweig is fond of terms 
like Schauplatz - of global competition. Keeping it that way (safeguarding 
British interests in Australia and Eastern Asia) obviously favored the 
British. Rosenzweig's geophilosophical analysis is that Britain succeeded 
in representing the world according to Mercator projection, with the globe 
transfotmed into a two dimensional representation with Europe at the center 
and the US and Japan at the extremes. The Pacific is then divided in such a 
way that the observer overlooks its role as a medium and possible object of 
contest. The tmth, on the other hand, is the earth as a globe. "Both, Japan 
like America, seem to forget that they have a 'back' [Riicken] and could 'turn 
around'. If they were to do so, two future enemies would look each other in 
the eye" (G 367). Rosenzweig seems to suggest, without being completely 
explicit, that we can see here the difference between British empiricism 
or analysis and a philosophy like German idealism, notably in Schelling's 
version, which assumes the task of thinking the whole. One could speculate 
that something analogous happens now, in so far as world crisis is seen to be 
located in the (poorly named) Middle East; this distracts attention from the 
long-term competition between the US and China. 
Rosenzweig proposes a geographical reversal of Hegel's world-histmy. 
Rather than treating geography as the initial staging point of histmy, he 
sees the unified earth with its continents and seas as history's telos. Today 
talk of earth's finitude brings to mind questions concerning climate change, 
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depleted natural resources, environmental pollution, and overpopulation. It 
remains to be seen whether these issues will be addressed by the ecumenical 
world order that Rosenzweig believed destined, or whether national states 
jockeying for position by war and other means will succeed in disrupting 
the emergence of a political order corresponding to the singular "Globus." 14 
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